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Abstract
Intrusion detection systems (IDS), as one of important security solutions, are used to
detect network attacks. With the extensive applications of traditional machine learn-
ing algorithms in the security field, intrusion detection methods based on the ma-
chine learning techniques have been developed rapidly. However, since the progress
of technology and the defects of the intrusion detection system based on machine
learning algorithms, the system has gradually failed to meet the requirement for
cyber security. Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) have been widely studied
and applied in anomaly detection in recent years thanks to their high potential in
learning complex high-dimensional real data distribution. Deep learning techniques
can greatly overcome the disadvantages of using traditional machine learning algo-
rithms for intrusion detection. This work proposes to use current existing GANs
and their variants for network intrusion detection using real dataset and show the
feasibility and comparison results.
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With the development and popularization of network and information technology,
the digital world has been deeply and extensively integrated into every aspect of daily
social activities. Individuals, organizations and governments are increasingly keep-
ing important and confidential data on the Internet. With the growth requirement
of internet, information security field is facing more and more serious challenges
from more and more diversified threats. Intrusion detection as an active defense
technology is one of the most important unavoidable solution to use in cybersecu-
rity area. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) use the distribution of sample data to
build an intrusion detection model to identify unauthorized activities on system and
computer networks that may pose threats to information confidentiality, integrity, or
availability (CIA) [1]. An IDS issues intrusion alerts when such attacks are detected
to respond to the attacks. The main goal of an IDS is to classify network traffic and
computer usage between malicious ones and normal ones which traditional stateless
firewalls cannot perform.
In the past decades, machine learning algorithms have been widely used in the
improvement on intrusion detection systems due to their high efficiency, flexibility
and deployability. Nowadays, IDSes based on machine learning techniques have
become the mainstream. However, due to the huge quantification and complexity
of malicious attacks, some shortcomings of traditional machine learning algorithms
have been amplified, such as the emphasis on processing low-dimensional data and
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the lack of response to high-dimensional data, and the reliance on manual features
selection.
The manual feature selection process omitted by deep learning has become a practi-
cal solution for machine learning tasks that process high-dimensional data. In recent
years, the application of deep learning algorithms in the field of intrusion detection
has developed rapidly. Algorithms such as Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs),
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) and Automatic Encoder (AE) have further
improved the accuracy and simplicity of IDSes [2–5].
Generative adversarial networks (GAN) are a class of deep learning algorithms that
implemented by two neural networks contesting with each other in a two-player game
framework. Since Goodfellow et al. [6] first published GAN’s paper in 2014, GAN
have shown their advanced advantage in generating higher-dimensional data such
as images, sounds asnd text. In addition, the improvement of anomaly detection
performance in other fields, especially medical imaging in the field of image, has
made outstanding contributions [7–9]. GAN has the following advantages in the
field of intrusion detection. First, GAN has a great potential to learn to mimic any
data distribution, allowing GAN to generate real data so an IDS can benefit from
more available data. Second, compared with other deep learning algorithms, GAN
has inherent potential and advantages when faced with adversarial attacks, such as
attackers generate malicious traffic and makes it similar to normal traffic in the hope
of tricking IDS into classifying it in the wrong class. Recurrently, there are many
studies using GAN to improve IDS or develop new attack patterns such as generate
adversarial malware examples [10–13]. But researches on GAN used in intrusion
detection are still scarce.
1.1 Motivation for Study
This paper will explore the influence of various parameters of GAN and its variant
Bidirectional Generative Adversarial Networks (BiGAN) on its detection efficiency
in intrusion detection. As more and more information security researchers pay at-
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tention to GAN’s application in intrusion detection, many excellent cases of GAN
and IDS are put forward. But these cases tend to focus on transverse comparisons
with IDS based on traditional machine learning algorithms and ignore their own
vertical comparisons.
There are many decisive factors, the first issue is how many the number of hidden
layers of the neural network is used. According to the hidden layer theory of neural
network, in general, the more layers, the better the training effect will be. An over-
fitted intrusion detection model will seriously reduce the prediction effect of the
model on the test data [14]. The second issue is training times. When a complete
dataset passes through the neural network once and returns once, this process is
called an epoch. As the number of epochs increases, the number of weight updates
in the neural network also become increased, and the curve changed from under-
fitting to over-fitting, while the appropriate epochs had no accurate answer, and the
answers were different for different models and datasets. The third issue is about
the number of samples; One of the prominent characteristics of GAN algorithms
is to generate the fake data according to the existing real data. The batch size of
noise and real data as inputs has an indispensable influence on the quality of the
generated data.
Among the GAN variants, BiGAN is a promising one. It combines the autoencoder
structure into a generic GAN framework, which is a typical variation of GAN in
structure [15]. It corrected for GAN’s difficulty in guessing the properties of one
pixel based on another by learning the data distribution in latent space. Some
previous studies have shown that its stability is better than traditional machine
learning algorithms and naive GAN algorithm.
1.2 Aim and Scope
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate models in terms of performance by run-
ning IDS based on GAN and BiGAN with different parameters. The research scope
includes background research, experiment implementation and testing, and perfor-
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mance index collection and analysis.This study will start with the collection of rele-
vant theoretical research data on GAN and its variants, then implement IDS based
on these models with existing GAN models, run and evaluate, and finally collect
and analyze derived measures based on confusion matrix.
1.3 Research Questions
This paper focuses on the following issues:
• What are the factors that affect performance of GAN and BiGAN based IDS?
• What are the effects of these factors?
• How can these factors be applied to improve IDS performance?
1.4 Organisation of the Thesis
The following is an overview of the structure of this thesis. The second chapter
introduces the background information of relevant research. The third chapter in-
troduces the research methods of this paper. The fourth chapter introduces the
research results and analysis. And the fifth chapter introduces the discussion and
conclusion of this paper.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, relevant researches related to the following topics will be elaborated,
including intrusion detection using deep learning techniques, GAN and its variant
BiGAN, and anomaly detection based on GAN. IDS is an important tool for network
system to detect security holes in the network. Depending on how the intrusion is
detected, there are two different types of IDS: signature based (misuse) IDS (SIDS)
and anomaly detection based IDS (ADIDS). Misuse detection has high detection
accuracy and low false alarm rate when dealing with known attacks, but its perfor-
mance drops sharply when facing unknown attacks and new attacks. In contrast,
anomaly detection behaves excellent at handling unknown and new attacks. Accord-
ing to Symantec corporation’s the annual Internet Security Threat Report (ISTR),
hundreds of millions of new malware variants have been discovered every year in
recent years, with 670 million found at the peak in 2017 alone. In addition, 1 in 10
URLs was defined malicious in 2018, compared with 1 in 16 in 2017. Because of the
large number of new malicious attacks that appear all the time, a lot of scholars are
now more focusing on anomaly detection [16].
The development of ADIDS usually consist of two phases, first using statistical or
knowledge methods to learn and build behavior model that is considered normal
from normal traffic profiles in the training phase, and then using new datasets to
establish the system’s reliable generalization ability against unknown intrusions in
the testing phase. When the ADIDS performing a detection task, any behavior that
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is observed to deviate significantly from the normal behavior model is is regarded as
anomaly, which can also be called an intrusion. This technology presupposes that
malicious behavior is different from typical user behavior.
Nowadays, a variety of machine learning algorithms have been used to learn from
intrusion datasets to create ADIDS. Machine learning is the process of extracting
patterns from large amounts of data. Machine learning models consist of a complex
set of ”transfer functions” that can be used to identify or predict behavior [17]. Using
machine learning algorithms can effectively improve the accuracy of detection and
reduce the requirement of human knowledge. Machine learning algorithms generally
can be classified into two categories: supervised learning and unsupervised learning.
Supervised learning algorithms learn and establish data patterns by identifying rel-
evant features and categories of marked training data. In supervised learning IDS,
each record is a pair consisting of a data source and a label that defines the record
as either intrusive or normal. In addition, IDS based on supervised learning can use
feature selection to exclude unnecessary features in the training data, and use the
remaining selected features to train the classifier to learn the internal relationship
between input data and labeled output values [18]. The supervised machine learning
algorithms that have been applied to intrusion detection including: Decision Tree
(J. Wang et al., 2009; Rutkowski et al., 2014; Jabbar et al., 2016 [19–21]), Näıve
Bayes (Yang et al., 2012; Koc et al., 2012 [22, 23]), Genetic Algorithms (Hoque
et al., 2012; Murray et al., 2014 [24, 25]), Artificial Neural Network (Wang et al.,
2010 [26]), Fuzzy Logic (Elhag et al., 2015 [27]), Support Vector Machines (Li et
al., 2012; Y. Chang et al., 2017 [28,29]), K-Nearest Neighbors (Lin et al., 2015 [30])
and so on.
Unsupervised learning algorithms create joint density models from a set of random
variables without class labels and obtain useful information from them. The label of
the output data in supervised learning IDS is given and used to train the model to
handle the unknown data, while in unsupervised learning IDS the label is unknown,
and instead of that, the data is automatically divided into different classes during the
learning process. Normal records will form sizable clusters, and the records in other
small clusters will be labeled as malicious attack data, because the performance of
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malicious records and normal records is not the same, so they belong to different
clusters. Common unsupervised learning algorithms include K-means (Annachhatre
et al., 2015 [31]), Self-Organized Maps (K. Labib et al., 2002; H. G. Kayacik et al.,
2007 [32,33]) and Hierarchical Clustering (Alcaraz, 2018; Shen et al., 2018 [34,35]).
Researchers working on IDS based on machine learning algorithms have also de-
veloped many methods to improve system performance, such as semi-supervised
learning between supervised and unsupervised learning. It can be combined with
the performance of a small number of tagged data classifiers to effectively reduce the
time and cost required when applied to IDS. At present, many previous works have
proposed many different semi-supervised learning techniques, such as self-training
(Blount et al., 2011; Lyngdoh et al., 2018 [36,37]), co-training (Rath et al., 2017 [38]),
semi-supervised SVM (Ashfaq et al., 2017 [39]), graphbased methods (Sadreazami
et al., 2018 [40]), etc. In addition, multiple machine learning algorithms are com-
bined to achieve better predictive performance using integrated approaches such as
enhanced integration, bagging integration, and stack integration. Random Forest
(J. Zhang et al., 2008; Jabbar et al., 2017 [41, 42]) is the best example of such a
method applied.
Figure 2.1: Machine Learning, Deep Learning and GAN
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2.1 Deep Learning in intrusion detection
In the past few years, deep learning algorithms have developed rapidly and a lot
of attention has been paid to them. As shown in Figure 2.1, deep learning is a
subset of Artificial Neural Network (ANN) algorithms in the classification of ma-
chine learning algorithms. Since 1943, when McCulloch et al. [43] first proposed
the idea of mathematical model based on imitating biological neurons, ANN has
gone through a long process of perfection. Hebb (1949) [44] proposed the adjust-
ment weight to lay a foundation for the subsequent improvement, then Rosenblatt
et al. [45] constructed the first learnable ANN - the Perceptron in 1958, and finally
in 1986 Rumelhar and Hinton et al. [46] proposed the back propagation algorithm
(BP) to perfect and shape ANN. Now ANN has become one of the most widely
used machine learning algorithms. ANN consists of several layers of neurons, each
of which is usually connected to all neurons in the adjacent network layer through
adaptive weights, which is also called full connection. According to the universal
approximation theorem in ANN’s mathematical theory, when the gradient of acti-
vation function does not vanish, ANN with a single hidden layer can approximate
every continuous function that maps real interval to some real output interval. In
other words, the single hidden layer ANN can characterize any nonlinear continu-
ous function. This kind of single hidden ANN can be classified as shallow learning.
In shallow learning, feature selection is processed separately instead of as part of
ANN, which is also the common deficiency of all the machine learning algorithms
mentioned above.
Deep learning was first realized by Hinton, one of the creators of BP algorithm, in
2006 [47], which also started the trend of rapid development of deep learning. Deep
learning is a set of machine learning algorithms that represent data as abstract con-
cepts corresponding to nested nonlinear hierarchy in neural networks by extending
the deep neural network architecture into multiple hidden layers and attempting to
learn at those levels. These levels correspond to concepts at different levels, where
lower-level concepts can define higher-level concepts, and the same lower-level con-
cepts can be used to define many higher-level concepts [48]. The biggest difference
between deep learning and shallow learning is that deep learning architecture has
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multiple hidden layers. Feature selection can be performed by the first few layers
of deep neural network, which enables deep learning to extract advanced features
so that high-level concepts can be learned, which makes up for the defects of ma-
chine learning algorithm. Although running the deep learning algorithm requires
huge computing power, due to the progress of the graphics processing unit (gpu)
and deep learning can optimize the million-level parameter model into small man-
ageable chunks through independent training of different layers in the model [47],
which greatly reduces the required computing resources.
Deep learning can be classified into three categories: deep networks of unsupervised
or generative learning, deep networks of supervised or discriminative learning, and
hybrid deep networks. The anomaly detection technology based on generative deep
learning uses the inherent attributes of unlabeled data instances to detect outliers,
and automatically labels these data samples to generate labeled data. The most
common generative deep learning algorithms are Restricted Moltzmann Machines
(RBMs) (Hinton, 2007; Fischer et al., 2014 [49,50]) and AutoEncoder (AE) (Hawkins
et al., 2002; Ranzato et al., 2007; Vincent et al., 2010 [51–53]). They all have the
function of reconstructing the input data, the difference is that the RBMs is an
undirected model, the data can flow in both directions in a model, which means that
the RBMs will reconstruct the input by feeding it backward through the model after
finishing training the data and feeding it forward, and the AE divides its hidden
layer into the encoder and decoder two parts, which the decoder is responsible
for the reconstruction, and the two parts will training together to minimize the
discrepancy between the input data and the reconstructed data. In addition, both
RBMs and AE can be stacked in layers to create deep learning models with deeper
neural networks. For example, Deep Belief Network (DBN) apply layer-by-layer
greedy learning strategy to stack RBMs so that many hidden layers can effectively
train data by activating an RBM. And stacked autoencoders uses multi-layer AE to
compress information gradually after series training.
The supervised deep anomaly detection technology learns the separate boundary
from the posterior distributions of classes conditioned on the labeled training data
and establishes multi-class classifier model, which is then used to classify the testing
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data instances into normal class and anomaly class. Compared with unsupervised
learning, supervised learning method has better performance, but lower popularity
due to the lack of clean data labels. The typical representative of this kind of
algorithm is the Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) (LeCun et al., 1990; 1998 [54,
55]), one of the most popular deep learning algorithms at present. CNN can extract
complex hidden features from high-dimensional data with complex structure through
three different layers (convolution layer, pooling layer and classification layer) that
constitute it, so that it can acquire the ability to detect outliers of sequence data
and image data. This makes CNN highly praised in the field of analyzing visual
images. CNN-based IDS needs to convert the input data into two-dimensional pixel
arrays. These arrays often shown as grayscale images, which is one of the biggest
challenges for IDS of this type.
It is worth mentioning that another popular deep learning algorithm, Recurrent
Neural Networks (RNN) (Pollack, 1990; Williams, 1989 [56, 57]), can be used for
either unsupervised or supervised. RNN is capable of handling sequential input
data of variable length. It processes one unit of input at a time and uses the output
of the hidden layer as an additional input to the next input, thereby modeling the
input or output of independent elements composed of sequences. This also enables
RNN to capture the feature of time or space sequence data and avoid the risk of
losing network state. Therefore, RNN has incomparable advantages in predicting
sequence data. In addition, the introduction of the long short-term memory (LSTM)
(Hochreiter et al., 1997 [58]) unit and the gated recurrent unit (GRU) (Cho et al.,
2014 [59]) makes up for the limitation that RNN loses its ability to capture as the
time step increases.
Hybrid deep learning combines generative models and discriminative models. In the
early stage, the feature selector in the hidden layer of the hybrid model, with the help
of the generative learning method, successfully obtained rich representative features
from the pre-training on large dataset, which makes the hybrid model effectively
reduced the sparsity issue when processing the high-dimensional data (also known
as the curse phenomenon), and eliminated the irrelevant features that would cover
up the anomalies. Then, in the later stage, it uses the discriminative method to
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distinguish the data. There are numerous hybrid deep learning algorithms, among
which the Generative Adversarial Networks used in this thesis is the most promising
one.
2.2 Generative Adversarial Networks
Generative models attempt to learn the exact distribution of real data for modeling,
and their importance is significantly increased because of their high adaptability in
various fields. However, most of the traditional generative models use the maximum
likelihood principle to train the model, in order to make the parameterization of the
model approximate to the real data distribution as much as possible, which makes
these models inadequate in dealing with the complexity of high-dimensional data.
GAN use the concept of adversarial learning instead of maximum likelihood, which
solves the deficiencies of other generative models.
GAN consists of two networks: the generator G and the discriminator D. The gener-
ator G learns to generate real-like fake samples by transforming noise variables z into
sample G(z) to deceive the discriminator, whereas the discriminator D is trained to
maximize the probability of determining whether its inputs are training examples
or G(z). Both G and D self-improve during the process so call ’adversarial’, and the





V (D,G) = Ex∼pdata(x)[log D(x)] + Ez∼pz(z)[1− log D(G(z))] (1)
where V (D,G) denotes binary cross entropy function for binary classification prob-
lems, Pdata(x) is the real data distribution and Pz(z) is the noise variable.
Since the final aim of the GAN model is to classify real samples or fake samples by
D, V (D,G) is the best choice of the objective function in the classification problem.
G maps noise z from latent space to input data that will be presented to D, which
accepts the input data and distinguishes whether the sample comes from real data
or from G. The [1−log D(G(z))] term indicates that if D determines that the sample
comes from real data, D will maximize its output, while if D determines the sample
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from G, D will minimize its output. At the same time, G tries to maximize D’s
output when submitting the fake samples generated by G to D, so as to achieve the
effect of of confusing D’s discrimination. As a result, D and G respectively attempt
to maximize and minimize V (D,G), thus forming the minimax adversarial relation
in the GAN expression equation. The GAN illustration is shown in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Generative Adversarial Networks
According to the theoretical derivation of Goodfellow et al [6], after several steps
of training and assuming that G and D both have sufficient capacity, the real data
probability distribution will be the same as the data probability distribution pro-
vided by G, and neither G nor D can be improved, that is, when the optimization
is achieved, an equilibrium state will occur between G and D, and D’s output is 0.5.
Two points can be inferred from this derivation. First of all, GAN can solve the
likelihood difficulty with only using the relative behavior of the two distributions.
Secondly, GAN can measure the discrepancy between the generated data distribu-
tion and the real data distribution in a implicit way through D, and then learn to
reduce the discrepancy.
Although GAN has certain advantages and theoretical support, but due to practical
problems and theoretical assumptions cannot be realized, many deficiencies have
been found, such as the capacity issue of discriminator and the lack of the ability
of learning the inverse mapping. Therefore, there are many researches developed
various GAN variants to solve these problems by changing the objective function,
the structure, etc. BiGAN is one of the variants with structure deformation.
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2.3 Bidirectional Generative Adversarial Networks
BiGAN is a novel unsupervised feature learning framework proposed by Donahue
et al. [60] in 2016, which extended by introducing an inference network into the
standard GAN model so that the discriminators can not only consider inputs from
data space but also jointly from data and latent space. It combines autoencoder
structure into regular GAN framework to learn the latent representation. BiGAN
consists of three neural networks: the generator G, the encoder E and the discrimi-
nator D, where G and E constitute the autoencoder. The encoder E compresses real
data samples x into latent representation z, while G, which can also be regarded as
a decoder, reconstructs the encoded data into the original data x. This autoencoder
structure can reconstruct the original data by learning the joint posterior distribu-
tion p(x|z), which improves the stability of the model by reducing the mode collapse
caused by GAN being unable to inference to the mapping of real data to latent
data. And by using the encoder to learn the inference X→Z, where X represents the
real data spaces and Z represents the latent spaces, of the latent representation of
high-dimensional data spaces, the autoencoder can also help to handle operations
at the level of abstraction. As for the benefits of learning the latent representations,
complex modifications can be made more easily in the data space by means of in-
terpolation or cascading conditions. By simultaneously training G and E as a whole
part as a generative model of the adversarial learning model, the autoencoder can
learn the inference while still generate high-quality samples. While D, as the other
part of the adversarial learning model, receives samples from X and Z, and it has
to discriminate not only the real and fake samples, but also the joint pairs (G(z);
z) and (x; E(x)). According to previous works of Zenati et al. [60–62], the BiGAN












Ex∼pG(·|z)[1− log D(x, z)]
]
= Ex∼pX [log D(x,E(x))] + Ez∼pZ [1− log D(G(z), z)] (2)
where pX(x) and pZ(z) are the distribution over the data and the latent representa-
tion, and pEX(x, z) and pGZ(x, z) are the joint distributions of pE(z | x), pX(x) and
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pG(x | z), pZ(z) that modeled by the generator and encoder.
Unlike the generator in GAN, E and G in BiGAN learn the joint probability distri-
bution of real data x and latent data z, instead of learning the real data distribution
directly. E maps x to the latent feature space of the model, and G maps noise z to
the real data space. E and G work together to try to maximize D’s output close to
1, while D still tries to maximize the objective function minG,E maxD V (D,E,G) as
it does in GAN. This is the minimax relation shown in Equation 2 and Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Bidirectional Generative Adversarial Networks
The optimal structure of BiGAN is similar to the optimal structure of GAN frame-
work, but also different. The largest difference is that it optimizes the Jenson-
Shannon Divergence (JSD) between the joint distribution of data space and latent
feature space. Donahue et al. deduced several theorems about this. First, if and
only if the joint distribution of pEX(x, z)and pGZ(x, z) are the same, and the JSD
value between them achieve the global minimum, that is, E and G reach the opti-
mum, and the output value of D is 0.5. Second, when the objective function of E and
G given the optimal discriminator, the JSD can be rewritten as a `0 loss function.
Since the `0 loss function does not make any assumptions about the structure or
distribution of the data itself, it can infer that all structural properties of BiGAN
are learned as part of the discriminator. Finally, theoretically, when E and G are
optimum, E and G are inverting each other in any case, but in practice, E and G
may never reach the optimum state due to the non-convexity of optimization [60].
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Chapter 3
Proposed Methods
Despite GAN developed rapidly and was widely used in various aspects. However,
the development of GAN-based IDS in the field of network security has just started.
Currently, there are few researches on the development of IDS based on GAN and
its variants algorithms, such as Efficient GAN Based Anomaly Detection (EGBAD)
developed by Zenati et al (2018) based on BiGAN, and IDSGAN developed by Lin
et al (2019) based on Wasserstein GAN [62–64]. Therefore, this thesis attempts to
explore the factors that can affect the performance of GAN-based IDS and under-
stand what impact can these factors have, so as to help future developers to develop
more efficient GAN-based IDS more easily.
This chapter summarizes the components of IDS based on GAN, including: data
pre-processing, IDS structure model, detection methods, and evaluation metrics.
Data pre-processing describes how to numeric convert and normalize the data in the
NSL-KDD dataset so that the data becomes vectors of completely numeric converted
that can be entered into IDS. IDSes based on GAN and BiGAN are implemented by
using the programming language Python with Keras as the deep learning framework.
The specific model refers to the existing code provided by many previous works, and
the main part is completed by making appropriate modifications according to the
code published by eriklindernoren on GitHub [65]. The whole experiments ran on
Ubuntu 18.04 system with a 2G Nvidia GeForce GTX 1050 GPU.
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3.1 Data Pre-processing
The NSL-KDD dataset is a refined version of the KDD’99 dataset [66]. The KDD
cup dataset has been widely used as a benchmark dataset in NIDS evaluation for
many years, but it has a fatal defect that both the training data and the test data
contain a large number of redundant records. In the training dataset and the test
dataset, approximately 78% and 75% of the records were redundant, respectively.
These redundant records makes the learning algorithm biased against frequent attack
records but neglects infrequent but harmful attack records. And the large number
of frequent normal records also weaken the learning algorithm’s learning of attack
records. The NSL-KDD dataset eliminates all redundant records in the training and
test data of the original KDD’99 dataset, and replaces the KDD’99 dataset as the
benchmark dataset for NIDS evaluation.
The NSL-KDD dataset contains 41 features and one ’label’ feature, and can be
classified into five classes. These classes consist of normal data and four types of
attacks, including Dos, Probe, R2L, and U2R. In the 41 features, three of them are
categorical except the , six are binary and 32 are numeric. For categorical features,
the LabelEncoder is used to transform categories to numbers and then used One-
Hot-Encoding to transform all these categorical features into binary features. After
encoding, we obtained a total of 123 features for training set and 117 features for
testing set. Therefore, we added the 6 lacked categories as empty columns to testing
set.
The datasets used in this work is from two files in the NSL-KDD dataset: KD-
DTrain+ and KDDTest+, which respectively contain the full NSL-KDD training
set and testing set, and the dataset files are from the UNB website [67]. The train-
ing set contains 22 attack classes and one normal class. The testing set contained
37 attack classes, 21 of them from 16 training set and 16 are novel ones, and one
normal class. Specific datasets details are shown in Table 3.1.
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Total Normal
Attack
Dos Probe R2L U2R
KDDTrain+ 125973 67343 45927 11656 995 52
KDDTest+ 22544 9711 7458 2421 2887 67
Table 3.1: Records Distribution of Training Set and Testing Set in NSL-KDD
Dataset
3.2 Experiments Models
According to the GAN and BiGAN models provided by eriklindernoren based on
Keras framework, corresponding IDS are implemented.IDS system can be divided
into two stages. The first stage is to train GAN and BiGAN models. At this
stage, noise variables consisting of random numbers uniformly distributed in the
(0,1) range are input into G to generate examples of adversarial normal traffic. In
the IDS based on GAN, these generated examples will be entered into D along
with normal traffic examples, that have been de-labeled and numeric converted,
from KDDTrain+ dataset. The generated examples in the IDS based on BiGAN
will be combined with the noise variables to joint pairs and then send into D with
another set of joint pairs consisting of real normal traffic examples and encoded
data generated by the encoder compressing real normal traffic examples. Then, D
will discriminate these traffic records to complete a training process. After this
training process is repeated for a given number of times, the system moves to the
second stage. In this stage, all data in the KDDTest+ dataset, including normal
traffic examples and malicious traffic examples, are pre-processed as training data
did before, be de-labeled and digitized. These pre-processed data xtext will be sent
to D for anomaly detection in GAN based IDS, which are different in the other IDS.
In the BiGAN based IDS, xtext will be compressed by the encoder to encoded data
xencoded, and then combined with xencoded to joint pair (xencoded, xtext), which will
be sent to D for detection instead of xtext. Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 shows the
outlines of the IDSes based on GAN and BiGAN.
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Algorithm 1: IDS based on GAN
Input: Original normal traffic examples xnormal from the training set
KDDTrain+; The random variable noise n;
Output: Detection result
Initialize the generator G and the discriminator D;
for Initialized GAN do
for i = 1, ..., training times do
for G do
G generates the fake normal traffic examples xgenerated from n
based on xnormal;
Send xgenerated to D;
end
for D do




for Trained D do
D classifies the testing set KDDTest+, getting predicted labels;
end
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Algorithm 2: IDS based on BiGAN
Input: Original normal traffic examples xnormal from the training set
KDDTrain+; The random variable noise n;
Output: Detection result
Initialize the generator G, the encoder E and the discriminator D;
for Initialized BiGAN do
for i = 1, ..., training times do
for G do
G generates the adversarial normal traffic examples xgenerated
from n based on xnormal;
Send joint pair (n, xgenerated) to D;
end
for E do
E compresses xnormal into latent space by encoding xnormal to
xencoded;
Send joint pair (xencoded, xnormal) to D;
end
for D do





for Trained D do
E encodes all traffic examples xtest in the testing set KDDTest+ to
xtest(encoded);
D classifies the joint pair dataset of (xtest(encoded), xtest)+, getting
predicted labels;
end
In the detection stage, the trained discriminator D can distinguish normal data from
abnormal data and output the output value of the range from 0 to 1. When the
output value is 1, D determines that the input is normal traffic example through
the prior adversarial learning in the training stage, otherwise the input is malicious.
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Predicted labels are generated by D after the testing dataset is input into D. All
values that are not equal to 1 in the predicted labels will be classified as 0, meaning
that the label of the data is attack.
3.3 Evaluation Methods
In order to comprehensively evaluate the performance of IDS based on GAN and
BiGAN, various parameters of the two IDSes were adjusted for running and testing
the systems. The whole evaluation experiments were phased to evaluate the per-
formance of IDSes with different value of learning rates, sample sizes (batch size),
training times (epochs), and the number of neural network layers (including the en-
coder, the generator, and the discriminator). Among them, the influence of learning
rate was tested in one phase, batch sizes and epochs were tested in one phase, and
numbers of layers of neural networks were tested in one phase. The parameters
tested in the same phase are related to each other.
In the first phase of the experiment, the influence of hyper-parametric learning rate
of the IDSes’ performances will be observed in the way that the initial value of the
learning rate is 0.0001, and the value decreases by 0.000001 each time when the
system completes a intrusion detection mission, and finally reduces to 0.000001. In
the next phase, the impact of an order of magnitude change in batch sizes and epochs
on the IDS models will be evaluated. The order of magnitude changes by the power
of 10 at each time of testing, so that the IDS performance variation from small values
to large values of these parameters can be shown more intuitive. The final phase
evaluates the efficiency of the IDS models by running in combinations of generators,
encoders, and discriminators with different numbers of hidden layers. As the tested
neural networks start from the shallow neural network with only one hidden layer,
and gradually increase the hidden layer until the relatively deep neural network with
20 hidden layers, the effect of the depth of neural network on the detection efficiency
is observed.
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3.4 Evaluation Metrics
IDS has many classification metrics. Since the experiments in this work is mainly
to discriminate normal records and malicious attack records, a confusion matrix of
two-classes classifiers is adopted to calculate the performance metrics. The confusion
matrix is a table that describes the classification results in detail. Each column of
the matrix represents the instance in the prediction class and each row represents
the instance in the actual class. The results can be summarized into the following
four basic situations:
• True Positive (TP): Normal records are correctly discriminated by the model.
• False Negative (FN): Malicious attacks are incorrectly identified as the normal
records.
• False Positive (FP): Normal records are incorrectly discriminated to be anomaly.
• True Negative (TN): Malicious attacks are successfully identified by the model.







Table 3.2: Confusion Matrix for the IDS
From these cases of confusion matrix, classification indicators such as: Accuracy,
Precision, Recall (Sensitivity), F1 score and AUC (Area under the Receiver Oper-
ating Characteristic (ROC) Curve) can be further calculated.
• Accuracy: The proportion of all predicted instances, including normal or
anomaly, that are correctly be predicted by the IDS. It is one of the longest
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used metrics to measure IDS performance, but it is not very useful when the
classes are not balanced.
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
• Precision: The ratio of normal records that are correctly discriminated by the








• F1-score: The balance between Precision and Recall, and it is expressed as




• AUC: The value of AUC is the sum of the area under the RoC curve, which
plots the False Positive Rate (FPR) on the x-axis and the True Positive Rate
(TPR) on the y-axis. The FPR and TPR are respectively the ratio of the
number of normal records that are identified as attack records and the number
of attack records that correctly be predicted to the total number of actual







In these metrics for evaluating IDS, the higher the value represents that the model
performs better. But in some cases the precision and recall are contradictory, so the
evaluation can only considered the balance according to the requirements of task.
Thus, F-1 score becomes an important indicator, the higher the score, the better
performance that the IDS has.
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Chapter 4
Results and Analysis
All experiments are done on a physical machine. For the accuracy of the data, each
IDS model corresponding to different parameters is run 50 times, and the final result
is the average of the 50 runs.
This chapter will present all experimental results and corresponding analysis results.
4.1 Performance of GAN Based IDS in Different
Value of Learning Rate
First of all, we evaluate the impact of learning rate. Learning rate is a non-negligible
configurable hyper-parameter in neural network training, with its value ranging from
0.0 to 1.0. It determines how quickly the model adapts to the learning, and too large
or too small of its value can cause serious issues. If the value of learning rate is too
large, the model will converge to the sub-optimal solution too quickly and miss the
optimal solution, while if the learning rate is too small, the process will take too
long and get into stuck. Therefore, it is very important to choose an appropriate
learning rate.
As shown in the Figure 4.1, when the learning rate starts to decrease from 0.0001,
the AUC value of IDS maintains a relatively stable range from 0.7 to 0.8 until the
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Figure 4.1: Value of AUC through learning rate
learning rate reaches about 0.00001, and then sharply drop to nearly 0.5. There-
fore, in the following experiment, the value of learning rate is taken as a relatively
compromised value of 0.00005.
4.2 Performance of IDSes with Different Amounts
of Batch Sizes and Epochs
It is not enough to transmit the complete dataset in the neural network once, that is,
only one epoch is not enough. When the number of times of transfer is not enough,
the gradient curve of the model is underfitted, so the complete dataset needs to be
transferred multiple times in the same neural network to reach the optimal solution.
However, if the value of epochs is too large, over-fitting will be occurred. Batch
size refers to the size of several new small datasets that need to be divided into
when a dataset is too large to be processed through the neural network at one
time. Continuously increasing the batch size by an order of magnitude makes it
possible to test IDS’s capability of handle big data. In addition, the sample data
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with batch size was extracted randomly from the KDDtrain+ dataset in this project,
which increased the complexity of the dataset and thus improved the precision of
evaluations of the IDSes.
Sample Size Training Times Accuracy Precision Recall F1 AUC
10
10 0.63904143 0.451381098 0.415044795 0.406822691 0.611794586
100 0.626120032 0.536543401 0.654582432 0.562117701 0.629582185
1000 0.513542406 0.472723305 0.973622696 0.634984526 0.569506353
10000 0.504934794 0.467827171 0.990485017 0.634548298 0.563996892
100
10 0.616064141 0.463286369 0.386618268 0.389568863 0.588154455
100 0.69586808 0.63315869 0.85690969 0.714014688 0.715457105
1000 0.479009936 0.452086354 0.982370508 0.619123491 0.540238476
10000 0.46674725 0.446677238 0.994629801 0.616464766 0.530958632
1000
10 0.626288591 0.463101253 0.428905365 0.394287943 0.60227899
100 0.628694996 0.565064479 0.923190197 0.690332408 0.664517252
1000 0.513364975 0.47406828 0.977988879 0.636735257 0.569881605
10000 0.44722099 0.437901458 0.998187622 0.608737742 0.514240308
10000
10 0.655267477 0.616196151 0.453552672 0.478903897 0.630730984
100 0.632880145 0.56684993 0.913659767 0.690749568 0.667034045
1000 0.517825142 0.475727539 0.981278962 0.639284016 0.574199444
10000 0.438480305 0.434072156 0.999330656 0.605247224 0.506701874
Table 4.1: The performance of GAN based IDS with different sample sizes and
training times
Sample Size Training Times Accuracy Precision Recall F1 AUC
10
10 0.647385114 0.468160934 0.321640408 0.35634656 0.607761683
100 0.710794446 0.607160003 0.719689012 0.648038571 0.711876377
1000 0.59780873 0.527459879 0.967377201 0.679571622 0.642762862
10000 0.472167761 0.449987805 0.99395016 0.619182022 0.535637123
100
10 0.642614443 0.50829326 0.308191741 0.345576757 0.601935425
100 0.71725071 0.644590582 0.856595613 0.728954693 0.734200557
1000 0.545896913 0.494190792 0.980836165 0.654594015 0.598802716
10000 0.488134315 0.458205437 0.997415302 0.627525612 0.550083012
1000
10 0.624784865 0.471567214 0.359875399 0.377514115 0.592561404
100 0.66527901 0.585482102 0.90506642 0.705614673 0.694446636
1000 0.542982612 0.493987768 0.983117084 0.654477582 0.596520359
10000 0.500563343 0.464221949 0.996282566 0.632941071 0.560862393
10000
10 0.635710167 0.500316578 0.439903203 0.416048138 0.611892301
100 0.670774929 0.589336428 0.923066625 0.713786947 0.701463571
1000 0.471934883 0.449486234 0.992050252 0.618468759 0.535201468
10000 0.481660309 0.453777678 0.99617959 0.623503748 0.544246189
Table 4.2: The performance of BiGAN based IDS with different sample sizes and
training times
According to Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, the size of training dataset does not show
a uniform trend on the performance of IDSes based on GAN and BiGAN, but the
time spent by running the models increases as the size training dataset grows, and
there is no fixed rule under cross-reference. AUC values of the IDSes’ evaluations,
for example, although with the growth of the value of the batch size, most results
present the tendency of increasing, but increasing processes are complicated, some
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of them rise after a drop, and some rise before they drop and then rise again, and
finally the growth of the AUC value was slightly, and some metrics show a continuous
decline trend. And considering the cost of time: when the value of the batch size
was 10, the IDS models complete 50 times evaluations within hours, and when this
value increased to 10000, the models took days to measurement, obviously this is a
very low efficiency.
But for epochs, its value has a significant impact on IDSes performance. Obviously,
there is a hundred place threshold for the effect of training times on model efficiency.
For both GAN-based and BiGAN-based IDS, when epochs is 100, the value of AUC,
accuracy, and precision in their evaluation reports are all reached maximum and then
slowly decrease, which means that the model performs best at this point. Most of the
time, the F1 score shows a similar trend, except when the batch size is 10. Moreover,
the value of recall increased with the growth of epochs and finally infinitely close 1.
For more details, a micro-detailed test of the impact of the change in the parameter
was conducted to observe the change in the AUC of the evaluations of IDSes from
the value of epochs is 10 to 1000. The trends of the test are shown in below.
Figure 4.2: Value of AUC through increased value of epochs
As shown in the Figure 4.2, the AUC values in the evaluations of IDSes based
on GAN and BiGAN reached the peak value when the epoch was 300 and 500,
respectively, and then both of them gradually declined. In contrast, the value of
AUC in the performance of GAN-based IDS drops more slowly but is more volatile,
while the value of AUC in the BiGAN one has a wider peak range, which means
that the BiGAN-based IDS performs better than the GAN-based IDS in the peak
range and also works more stable.
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4.3 Performance of IDSes with Different Number
of Layers of Neural Network Hidden Layers
The meaning of hidden layer in neural network is to abstract the features of input
data into another dimension space to show its more abstract features, which can be
better divided linearly. Multiple hidden layers are actually multi-level abstractions
of input features, and the ultimate purpose is to better linearly partition different
types of data. Theoretically, the more number of hidden layers there are, the clearer
the feature division will be. However, after a certain number of hidden layers are
added, the enhancement of classification effect will be less and less obvious, and the
neural network may become too complicated and even over-fitting will occur.
Before comparing the effects of generator and discriminator depth, evaluate the per-
formance of BiGAN-based IDS with combinations of encoders and generators with
different hidden layers. The encoders and generators in BiGAN make up the autoen-
coders, and in some variants of the more advanced version of BiGAN, the adversarial
learning take place between them instead of the discriminator. Theoretically, the
optimal structure of the autoencoder is when the two neural networks are inverse to
each other, which means they are relatively symmetric.
Generator Encoder Accuracy Precision Recall F1 AUC
1
1 0.590900018 0.532784076 0.880511791 0.65369417 0.626128256
5 0.648853353 0.577804665 0.882669138 0.687173836 0.677294594
10 0.69209324 0.603074164 0.765338276 0.659521138 0.701002731
20 0.656717974 0.591418979 0.821001957 0.670706823 0.676701399
5
1 0.631791164 0.561339293 0.913129441 0.687959866 0.666013018
5 0.698771292 0.625641673 0.846400989 0.696106501 0.716728898
10 0.619490774 0.555482241 0.847368963 0.657811672 0.647209768
20 0.671888307 0.600436363 0.823874987 0.682608143 0.690375895
10
1 0.660124645 0.583688804 0.91532283 0.705480733 0.691166831
5 0.648314407 0.580936594 0.804654515 0.652646085 0.667331544
10 0.689555979 0.624923369 0.824055195 0.698834066 0.7059164
20 0.666523243 0.596404627 0.846195037 0.688262585 0.688378435
20
1 0.648782381 0.572587039 0.883240655 0.689577423 0.677301774
5 0.680879613 0.603275928 0.853815261 0.69329519 0.701915423
10 0.652528389 0.575570062 0.818211307 0.657764352 0.67268198
20 0.657097232 0.615468289 0.82828236 0.677553395 0.677920109
Table 4.3: The performance of BiGAN based IDS with different numbers of layers
of Generator and Encoder. The Discriminator used in this table has only one layer.
Table 4.3 shows the effect of depth changes in encoders and decoders on the per-
30 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
formance of BiGAN-based IDS. In terms of results, there is no directional trend
except that as the depth of encoder increases, the value of F1 increases in a wave
sharp, that is, it first grows then drop, and then raise again. It is worth noting,
however, that in some cases the IDS performs well when encoder and decoder have
the same number of hidden layers, especially when they both have five layers of
hidden layers. While another interesting phenomenon is that if the AUC value form
extracted separately, and the number of hidden layer upon layer of the encoder and
decoder for axis, will find that in most cases the table is symmetry, for example:
when the numbers of hidden layers in the encoder are 5 and 10, as the growth of the
decoder on the number of hidden layers, the AUC value showed a trend of twists
and turns of sexual growth and reduce respectively, one goes up then down and then
up, and the other did the opposite way. In a word, the encoder and decoder with
symmetric structure have some merits. Therefore, in the following experiments, it
will be regarded as a generator of symmetric autoencoder structure in BiGAN and
compared with the discriminator.
Generator Discriminator Accuracy Precision Recall F1 AUC
1
1 0.642916075 0.584664045 0.893255072 0.694321005 0.673367191
5 0.724363467 0.678468102 0.703171661 0.685465934 0.721785706
10 0.607055092 0.595217259 0.255076717 0.354418261 0.564240611
20 0.55157248 0.180338964 0.011842241 0.021116197 0.485919952
5
1 0.589879791 0.528030959 0.911569354 0.662101978 0.629009956
5 0.727510646 0.686001565 0.682087324 0.679635989 0.721985375
10 0.606010468 0.591426371 0.253779219 0.351966217 0.563165227
20 0.557773687 0.214656924 0.00407785 0.007752489 0.490422389
10
1 0.604220635 0.546768548 0.890165791 0.664806645 0.639002868
5 0.726131121 0.682109153 0.685547317 0.680445016 0.721194527
10 0.611652768 0.601430444 0.27291731 0.371175914 0.570449148
20 0.556400816 0.186572602 0.005056122 0.009479357 0.489335511
20
1 0.629905962 0.564166887 0.89261662 0.682989132 0.661861961
5 0.747201029 0.698804991 0.729610751 0.709709923 0.745061356
10 0.600623226 0.567394091 0.247559469 0.338442013 0.557676719
20 0.555855216 0.205249433 0.012480692 0.02095339 0.489759398
Table 4.4: The performance of GAN based IDS with different numbers of layers of
Generator and Discriminator
As Table 4.4 shows, in GAN based IDS, with the increase of the number layers of
the generator, the experiment results are not affected by bias effect. Meanwhile,
the experiment results recorded by running GAN with the increase of the number of
discriminator layers show a peculiar result. It shows that when the discriminator has
five layers, the AUC, precision and accuracy reach the maximum value, and then the
values of these metrics continue to decline with the increase of the number of layers
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Generator & Encoder Discriminator Accuracy Precision Recall F1 AUC
1
5 0.668583659 0.621038289 0.406647101 0.481187821 0.636721821
10 0.552648155 0.369492133 0.04025847 0.067678784 0.490321318
20 0.566197214 0.356311996 0.000864998 0.001673818 0.497430473
5
5 0.667975958 0.652947967 0.397616105 0.483569895 0.635089515
10 0.556897622 0.467612042 0.036504994 0.061873668 0.493597311
20 0.568871984 0.287512692 0.000550922 0.001088232 0.499741681
10
5 0.69065605 0.759049295 0.437457522 0.532133207 0.659857102
10 0.552559439 0.323221977 0.031505509 0.053826685 0.489178688
20 0.568847587 0.227718416 0.000391309 0.000779749 0.499700836
20
5 0.692776348 0.748312466 0.421599217 0.529094889 0.659790492
10 0.553714957 0.310331934 0.033853362 0.056704171 0.490479241
20 0.568876419 0.306562327 0.000478838 0.000948965 0.499736809
Table 4.5: The performance of BiGAN based IDS with different numbers of layers
of Generator and Discriminator. The Decoder (Generator) and Encoder are used
together as Generator in a symmetric structure.
of the discriminator. This is highly similar to the results of running model with
different number of epochs. The main difference between the two evaluation reports
lies in the recall value. In the previous phase, the recall value increased with the
increase of training times, while in this phase, the recall value showed an opposite
performance, which decreased with the increase of the depth of the discriminator.
The records in Table 4.3 and Table 4.5 can be combined to obtain a comprehensive
evaluation of BiGAN-based IDS with different levels of generators and discrimina-
tors. Accuracy and precision metrics are in peak when the number of hidden layers
of the discriminator increases to 5 and then continually decreasing, which is similar
to the trend in accuracy and precision in GAN based IDS evaluation report. While
the value of recall and F1 score declined sharply with the increase of the number of
discriminator hidden layers. Although the recall also continued to decrease in the
evaluation report of IDS based on GAN, but the magnitude was not so dramatic,
while the performance of F1 score was significantly different in the two reports. The
value of AUC is similar to its performance in the evaluation report of GAN based
IDS only when the encoder and generator level is 1. In the other conditions, it
shows a continuous decline trend. However, with reference to the three tables at
this phase, it is reasonable to infer that the peak range of AUC in the evaluation
report of IDS based on BiGAN has moved forward. As in the previous phase, this
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will be further tested. In addition, in the evaluation reports of GAN-based IDS and
BiGAN-based IDS, when the number of hidden layers of the discriminator reaches
20 and 10 respectively, the AUC value is less than but close to 0.5, which usually
means two situations: algorithm is bad or the discriminator is in the chance level in
the long run. In this experiment, it is suitable for the second situation which means
that over-fitting occurs.
Figure 4.3: Value of AUC through increased number of layers of Discriminator’s
hidden layers
As shown in Figure 4.3, the AUC value in the evaluation report of IDSes based
on GAN and BiGAN reaches the maximum value as expected when the number of
layers of discriminator is 5 and 3 respectively, and then gradually decreases. By
contrast, the value of AUC in BiGAN-based IDS evaluation reports declines more
steeply and over-fits occur earlier, but it presents a smoother curve. These mean
that BiGAN-based IDS’s discriminator has less capacity but the system is more
stability.
4.4 Limitations of Study
• Due to time, another GAN variant named Wasserstein GAN that mentioned
in this thesis, which is applied in the field of network information security
intrusion detection, has not been evaluated in this work.
• As this experiment aims to compare the influence of parameters, the detection
method is relatively simple with low accuracy, which needs to be improved.
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• During the experiment, the average value of the evaluation results obtained
by running IDS for 10 times and the average value of the results obtained by
running IDS for 50 times presented different effects. Limited by time and ex-
perimental equipment, it was impossible to further verify the results obtained
by more times such as 100 times and 1,000 times.
• When the numbers of layers of encoder and generator are the same, the per-
formance of BiGAN-based IDS is relatively outstanding, which is limited by
the experimental equipment and cannot be further verified
4.5 Future Work
After evaluating and testing the parameters that affect GANs based IDS, some new
considerations about how to research and develop such IDS more effectively have not
yet been discussed in this paper for further study.These future direction including:
• Some parameters that may affect the performance of GANs based IDS, such
as activation functions, number of neurons, and so on, can be tested in the
future.
• Some other GAN variants may be used for intrusion detection. For example,
the InfoGAN of the autoencoder deformation-occurring re-discriminator also
uses the latent space; Cycle-GAN used in the field of images anomaly detection;
And C-RNN-GAN which is combined with RNN and both these two algorithms
had been apply for intrusion detection. These variants more or less show the
potential in the field of network security intrusion detection.
• In addition, there are many other data sets for testing IDS besides the common
NSL-KDD dataset, such as CAIDA, ISCX 2012, ADFA-LD, CICIDS 2017,
etc. These data sets have their own characteristics, and testing them in GANs
based IDS can be a good supplement.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
As society’s reliance on information technology and related threats have increased,
so has the importance of security. As an important member of information security
technology, intrusion detection technology develops rapidly. Especially with the de-
velopment and popularity of neural network algorithm, deep learning algorithm has
been widely applied in intrusion detection.As a deep learning algorithm, generative
antagonistic learning algorithm has a novel concept, broad prospects and proved it-
self in anomaly detection in other fields. It has great potential in the field of network
security intrusion detection.
Although the potential is great, the IDS based on the algorithm of generative ad-
versarial networks class is very few. This is undoubtedly due to the fact that this
kind of algorithm is relatively new and the hardware requirements are strict, but
the lack of relevant supplementary research data is also one of the most important
reasons.
This work has shown the effect of parameters and neural network structure on the
performance of GANs-based IDS. The experimental results have shown that epoch
and the number of hidden layers of the discriminator have significant effects on IDS
performance, and GAN combined with autoencoder can effectively improve IDS
stability by utilizing latent space.
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